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Abstract
Smart devices produce security-sensitive data and keep
them in on-device storage for persistence. The current storage
stack on smart devices, however, offers weak security guar-
antees: not only because the stack depends on a vulnerable
commodity OS, but also because smart device deployment is
known weak on security measures. To safeguard such data on
smart devices, we present a novel storage stack architecture
that i) protects file data in a trusted execution environment
(TEE); ii) outsources file system logic and metadata out of
TEE; iii) running a metadata-only file system replica in the
cloud for continuously verifying the on-device file system
behaviors. To realize the architecture, we build Overwatch, a
TrustZone-based storage stack. Overwatch addresses unique
challenges including discerning metadata at fine grains, hid-
ing network delays, and coping with cloud disconnection. On
a suite of three real-world applications, Overwatch shows
moderate security overheads.
1 Introduction
Smart devices, such as security cameras, voice assistants, and
cleaning robots, emerge to be important cyber-physical sys-
tems. Unlike generic platforms such as PC, a smart device
centers on a specific mission, e.g., capturing/analyzing videos
or responding to voice commands. For engineering ease, they
typically run commodity OSes such as Linux [63, 44, 84].
During operation, smart devices continuously generate data,
e.g. video footage, floor maps, and flight logs. On one hand,
the data is often confidential, e.g. for containing personally
identifiable information; uploading the data to public cloud is
often undesirable. On the other hand, the data often has high
business value, e.g. for containing important traffic events;
data loss should be prevented. Smart devices, in the face of
limited memory and possible power failures, often write the
data to local non-volatile storage and may retrieve the data
for processing later. In this process, the data is handled by a
storage stack which spans file systems, the block layer, and
storage hardware, as shown in Figure 1(a). It is the storage
stack’s responsibility to safeguard the data: not only keeping
the data confidential but also assuring that the data has been
correctly kept persistence and can be retrieved in the future.
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Figure 1: An overview of this work
Unfortunately, the storage stack on today’s smart devices is
incapable of such guarantees. Vulnerabilities in file systems
and their runtime environment, a commodity OS kernel, are
not uncommon. The threats are further amplified by smart
devices’ weak IT management, e.g. weak passwords and de-
layed security patches [57, 88, 56, 30]. Attackers, on-device
or remote, may exploit vulnerabilities through the user/ker-
nel interface or the interface exposed by privileged network
services and hence compromise the smart device OS kernel.
They may learn the data, inject fabricated data, or delete data
covertly.
Prior solutions were inadequate in addressing these threats.
Cryptographic file systems [28, 83, 89] are subject to Iago
attacks from a compromised kernel [31]. They can only detect
data integrity violation in retrospect which is less effective
for memory-limited smart devices: upon the detection of vio-
lation, the data may already be lost permanently. File system
checkers [49, 42] and kernel checkers [43, 22] look for vi-
olation of envelope behaviors and also do so in retrospect.
These checkers often demand substantial CPU/memory re-
source, likely unavailable on smart devices. Kinetic disks [65]
push the check logic down to storage hardware; it requires
new hardware support yet to be seen on off-the-shelf smart
devices.
Modern CPUs offer Trusted Execution Environments
(TEE) which are strongly isolated from the commodity ker-
nel. ARM TrustZone supports a TEE to fully own physical
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memory regions and storage hardware, e.g. an eMMC RPMB
partition [77]. While a TEE is already used for isolating pro-
gram code that accesses security-sensitive data [48] and the
underlying storage hardware, it sees difficulty in enclosing
file systems, the largest portion of the storage stack. On one
hand, commodity file systems are diverse, feature-rich, and
have deep dependency on the kernel. Porting them into TEE
would bloat the TEE with substantial file system and ker-
nel code (as well as their vulnerabilities). On the other hand,
reinventing new file systems for a TEE, commonly seen in
today’s TEE-based systems [58, 8], gives away mature fea-
tures of commodity file systems and fragments the file system
ecosystem.
To achieve strong security properties while reusing existing
file systems as much as possible, we follow the principle of
least privilege [76] and take an outsource and verify approach:
keeping any storage code out of TEE, as long as the code
needs no access to data; verifying the outsourced code with a
trusted party. This raises three primary questions.
First, how to identify a clean, narrow boundary for outsourc-
ing? Rather than relying on sophisticated code analysis and
slicing [69], our insight is that the boundary already exists in
a commodity kernel: all file systems export generic interfaces
to the page cache above and to the block layer below (see
Figure 1(a)). The interfaces only contain several functions
that work in a message-passing fashion. Hence, we partition
the storage stack at these two interfaces and outsource file sys-
tems in between. This makes the current functional boundary
a protection boundary.
Second, how can a file system operate properly when it is
strongly isolated from the underlying storage? Our insight is
that file systems, in principle, operate only on metadata but
not file data. Hence, we keep file data inside the TEE while
serving the metadata to the file system outside of the TEE.
Third, which party can be trusted for verifying the behav-
iors of outsourced file system? Our insight is that the cloud,
with rigorous security management, offer a more trustworthy
execution environment than smart devices. Therefore, we run
a novel, metadata-only file system replica in the cloud; the
replica’s sole goal is to validate the behaviors of the local
file system. This is shown in Figure 1(b). At run time, the
TEE sends any invoked file APIs to a pair of twin file systems:
the local, untrusted file system (“evil twin”) and an in-cloud,
trusted replica (“good twin”). The TEE may perform storage
operations advised by the evil twin (fast), but will only ac-
cept the outcome when the good twin confirms the operations
(slow).
The resultant advantages are threefold. We offer strong
confidentiality: file data never leaves the on-device TEE (not
even to the cloud). We bring the trustworthiness of the storage
stack on smart devices to the level of its counterpart running
in a rigorously-managed datacenter. We reuse unmodified
commodity file systems and only add light code to the TEE.
To make the approach practical, we address multiple unique
challenges: ensuring file data to flow only in TEE, discerning
metadata at fine grains, hiding network delays, and continuing
serving file access even when the cloud is disconnected. We
build Overwatch, a concrete implementation based on ARM
TrustZone with a suite of new designs. Our experiments show
that Overwatch’s security mechanism incurs moderate over-
head in representative smart device applications: 15%-45%
increase in application latency and 5% loss in application
throughput.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• Towards securing storage on smart devices, we conduct
an analysis of their file IO, the attacks they face, and how
existing solutions fall short in defeating attacks.
• We present a secure storage stack architecture for smart
devices. It outsources file system logic and metadata while
protecting file data. It runs a novel, metadata-only file system
replica in the cloud for continuous verification. We analyze
how the new architecture thwarts the aforementioned attacks.
• We build Overwatch, a concrete secure storage stack that
incarnates the proposed architecture. Overwatch addresses
system challenges with a suite of novel designs, including
secure data path, metadata stencils, and emergency files.
• We demonstrate that Overwatch works with ext2 and f2fs,
two popular, unmodified file systems. Atop Overwatch, we
build multiple real-world smart device applications which
show moderate security overhead.
2 Background & Motivations
2.1 TrustZone and its unique features
A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is isolated by hard-
ware, as exemplified by Intel SGX [72] and ARM Trust-
Zone [2]. Unlike SGX, TrustZone partitions all hardware
resources of a System-on-Chip (SoC) into a normal (insecure)
world and a secure world. In particular, the security of our
system benefits from the following TrustZone features:
1) Physical memory partitioning. Unlike SGX where the
untrusted OS maps memory pages to the TEE dynamically at
runtime, TrustZone partitions the physical memory statically
at boot time. The normal world is strongly isolated from the se-
cure memory and therefore cannot mount controlled-channel
attacks [85] against the latter.
2) IO partitioning. Unlike SGX where TEE accesses IO
through the untrusted OS, TrustZone isolates peripherals by
statically assigning them to different worlds at boot time. It
does so by assigning IO interrupts and IO memory regions
through the TrustZone Protection Controller. This allows the
secure world to fully own on-device storage hardware, e.g.
one SD card or a specific partition on an eMMC device [77].
We refer to such storage devices owned by TEE as secure
disks1 in the remainder of this paper.
1While recognizing that smart devices often use flash-based storage, we
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2.2 The storage stack
We use Linux, one of the most popular OSes for smart de-
vices [16, 63, 44, 84], as the example. The storage stack is
illustrated in Figure 1(a). At its top, the stack provides a Vir-
tual File System (VFS) layer, which caches recent file data
(via a page cache) and exports a set of common APIs for all
concrete file systems (e.g. ext3 or f2fs) to implement. All file
systems invoke a common block layer, which serves block
I/O requests from the former and accordingly drives the disk
(through device drivers) below.
In response to a client’s file API invocation (e.g. “read 42
bytes from /local/data at offset 100”), VFS first attempts to
serve the invocation from its page cache. Upon cache miss,
VFS invokes the underlying file system, which translates the
API invocation to disk block operations (e.g. “read from block
21”). The block operations are served by the block layer. In
this process, the file system inspects metadata, e.g. inode table,
for which it may trigger additional block operations. At the
end, the kernel copies the read block data to the page cache
and then the client’s buffer. File write is a mirror process.
2.3 File IO patterns on smart devices
Unlike general-purpose platforms such as servers and PCs,
smart devices are single-purpose, e.g. security cameras for
surveillance, robots for cleaning floors, voice assistants for
responding to user commands. During operation, a smart
device generates data pertaining to user interest or its own
operation. Our study of multiple off-the-shelf smart devices
(see Section 5 for details) reveals the following IO patterns
which have strong implications on our security objectives.
User data is the focus of protection We use “user data” to
refer to the data produced by smart device operations. Exam-
ples include captured videos, learnt user voice models, and
robot operation logs. User data is often privacy-critical, e.g.
user models may be tracked back to individuals; the data is
often business-critical, e.g. captured videos may contain im-
portant crimes and accidents. It is crucial to prevent user data
leakage and loss.
Besides user data, smart devices are preloaded with system
data, e.g. program binaries or configuration files, often located
in directories different from user data. System data has lower
value for protection: one could dump the system data from
any off-the-shelf smart device of the same model.
Directory structures are pre-defined On smart devices, the
structures of file directories, including the tree topology, the
numbers of subdirectories at each tree level, and the numbers
of files in each subdirectories, are typically pre-defined at
device development time. They cater to the device’s applica-
tion logic and often remain unaffected by user data discussed
above. One could learn the pre-defined directory structure by
dumping the storage of off-the-shelf devices [84, 44].
use “disk” as a generic term for non-volatile storage
We find this pattern in most, if not all, popular smart de-
vices. i) Security camera systems, including WyzeCam [63]
and MotioneyeOS [16], store captured videos as same-length
footage, under directories organized by time ranges. ii) Voice
assistants, such as the opensource Mycroft [7], keep each
user-defined rule (“skill”) and the corresponding response
in a dedicated directory; while operating, it stores captured
voices as same-length clips under /tmp. Amazon Echo Dot, a
commodity voice assistant, is likely to have similar behaviors
based on the limited information revealed in reverse engineer-
ing [84]. iii) Robot cleaners, such as Xiaomi Mi, stores all the
operation logs as well as the floor map in one specific direc-
tory [44]. iv) Drones, such as DJI Phantom 2, stores all sensor
data (e.g. images with EXIF data) in a directory structure
similar to security cameras [64].
Block access patterns are regular Being single-purpose,
smart devices show regular block-access patterns as driven by
their application logic, which again is orthogonal to user data.
Regardless of captured video contents, a security camera
creates new directories periodically and keeps appending data
to video files. During one operation, the cleaning robot keeps
appending to log files; after the operation, it reads back log
files sequentially and writes to a floor map file sequentially.
A voice assistant periodically scans its “skill files” and write
recorded audio samples to wav files sequentially.
Such regular access of file contents, combined with access
to pre-defined directory structures, result in regular, repetitive
block traces, e.g. querying the super block, read one meta-
data block and a fixed number of data blocks, and write one
metadata block back.
Implications On smart devices, the user data resulted from
device operation should be the focus of protection. By con-
trast, the system data, the directory structures, and the block
access pattern, are pre-defined, can be learnt by analyzing off-
the-shelf devices, and therefore have lower security values.
2.4 Security threats & design objectives
Smart devices suffer from common weakness of IoT, notably
weak passwords and delayed security patches [79, 82]. Lo-
cal and remote adversaries, through compromising the smart
device OS, can break the security of user data.
Example attack paths are as follows. i) A local unprivileged
adversary may exploit file system bugs to corrupt the file
data [11, 12]. ii) Local unprivileged adversaries may exploit
kernel vulnerabilities through the user/kernel interface [15].
iii) Remote adversaries may exploit may exploit vulnerabili-
ties in privileged network services (e.g. an HTTP server [13])
or the kernel network stack [14]. For ii) and iii), a successful
adversary either gain the root privilege or become capable
of executing arbitrary code in the kernel context. She then
replaces key functions in the file system, e.g. submit_bh()
which moves data to/from the block layer. Her own malicious
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substitute for the function may to reveal, modify, or drop the
user data in the file system.
Observation: cloud as a more trustworthy environment
Like smart devices, the servers in datacenters also face threats
from the vulnerabilities in their system software. Unlike smart
devices, the servers are hosted in a more trustworthy envi-
ronment. i) Datacenters follow rigorous standards [47] and
mature protocols [74] in the face of incidents and vulnerability.
By contrast, smart devices are often configured in batches and
weakly [78]; their much delayed security patches leave a large
window of attacks. ii) Datacenters can afford heavyweight
security measures including frequent kernel introspection and
regular file system checkers. By contrast, these measures are
often unaffordable to a smart device, which only has a few
CPU cores, a few GB DRAM, and limited power supply.
Fortunately, today’s smart devices are typically designed
under the assumption of cloud connectivity for enriching their
functionalities. This observation motivates us to secure the
smart device storage with the assistance of the cloud.
Objectives Strong confidentiality for file data. We ensure
that user data never leaves the on-device TEE. Catering to
smart device file IOs (§2.3), we carefully choose to protect file
contents, file names, and directory names; we do out protect
directory structures and file system metadata including super
blocks, allocation maps, and inodes; we do not protect block
access patterns which are regular.
Continuous assurance of data integrity and persistence.
We set to bring the trustworthiness of a storage stack running
on smart devices to the level of its counterpart running in
a rigorously-managd datacenter. At this level of trustworthi-
ness, the storage stack ensures that: a successful read reflects
the most recent write to the same file location; a successful
fsync() implies that the data becomes persistent on the disk.
Practicability. We set to respect the diverse, mature file
systems by reusing their code with little modification. We set
to add as little code to TEE as possible; we set to keep the
interface exposed by TEE as narrow as possible.
3 Security approach overview
3.1 Scope
Target scenarios We target smart devices for recording/an-
alyzing environment data and/or serving human users; such
devices are commonly seen in homes or offices, as exempli-
fied by security cameras and voice assistants. We recognize
the significance of mission-critical devices with tight control
loops, but do not target it.
During operation, the smart devices generate data (“user
data”) that is privacy-critical and/or business-critical; the
smart devices store the data to files for persistence. We trust
the TrustZone-based TEE on a smart device; the TEE al-
ready encloses a secure disk as well as app code (i.e. secure
System TCB SG
Cryptographic FS [28, 83, 27] OS CI-
FS checkers [49, 42] OS -I-
Kernel checkers [43, 22] TEE C−−
Outsource w/o verify [19, 80, 17, 48] TEE CI-
Overwatch (this work) TEE CIP
SG: security guarantees.
C: data confidentiality; I: data integrity; P: persistence assurance
Table 1: A comparison of existing solutions and this work
clients) that accesses the protected user data. We assume
cloud connectivity but nevertheless design to cope with poor
connectivity or even disconnection. We assume a “honest
but curious” cloud service that execute timely patched, thor-
oughly checked file systems; however, we do not trust the
cloud for data confidentiality.
In-scope threats. We consider malicious adversaries inter-
ested in learning user data and tampering with it. We assume
powerful adversaries: it takes full control of the smart de-
vice’s OS, including the encompassed file systems, network
stack, and any user processes atop the OS. The compromised
file system may alter or covertly drop write requests; it may
supply wrong data to read requests.
Out-of-scope threats. We consider the following threats
out of scope: i) Exploitation of TEE kernel bugs [53, 4, 5].
ii) Physical attacks, e.g. snooping TEE’s DRAM access [25,
18]. iii) Availability attacks, e.g. a compromised OS could
refuse to boot or deny requests from TEE; Many of these
attacks are mitigated by prior work [61, 92, 35, 90] orthogonal
to Overwatch. Note that controlled-channel attack [85] does
not apply to ARM TrustZone as the latter’s page management
is within TEE unlike Intel SGX.
3.2 Existing approaches are inadequate
Cryptographic file systems [28, 59, 45] guarantee data con-
fidentiality/integrity but not file system correctness; they are
also subject to Iago attacks [31] from a compromised kernel,
e.g. by overwriting data blocks and hence causing permanent
data loss. To enforce an envelope of file system behaviors, a
file system can be certified through formal methods [32, 75]
or checked at run time [52]. However, most commodity file
systems are not built with formal methods; envelopes does
not capture all possible file system behaviors; deploying per-
file-system checkers into the smart device TEE is likely to
increase the edge TCB and the overhead significantly [42, 49].
Data auditing [20, 73] proves data possession but not persis-
tence. Non-repudiable IO [23] ensures that given disk reads or
writes hit the disk while not asserting file system correctness.
While much prior work can detect damicrobenchmarkta loss
in retrospect, few techniques prevent it from happening.
To support TEE code for accessing storage, existing TEE-
based systems take ad-hoc solutions: leaving the whole stor-
age stack out of TEE and delegating file APIs to it [58, 19, 68],
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Figure 2: The Overwatch architecture
pulling an entire storage stack to TEE, or hand-crafting a
miniature stack (e.g. by only supporting a set of predefined
files) [17, 48, 55]. Lacking systematic treatment, they suffer
from Iago attacks, bloating TEE, and giving up decades of
file system development, respectively. As file systems are
tightly coupled with the kernel environment, pulling a whole
file system into TEE would end up pulling most, if not all,
of the kernel dependency (at least 30K SLoC): address space
and page management (15K), memory allocator (7K), locking
(8K), etc. This bloats the TEE codebase.
3.3 Our key ideas
Our observations are: i) although the file systems are com-
plex, the data functions, i.e. page cache and block layer, are
much simpler and hence fit TEE; ii) although file systems
have disparate internals, they operate on storage data through
a narrow, unified block interface; iii) compared to smart de-
vices, the cloud offers a more trustworthy environment to file
systems (§2.4).
Accordingly, we propose the following designs as illus-
trated in Figure 2.
1. Protecting file data while outsourcing file system logic.
We partition the current storage stack: within TEE we isolate
VFS, which tracks opened files and serves page cache, and
the block layer, which guards a trusted disk2 owned by TEE
and all the data on the disk. We leave the unmodified code of
commodity file systems (e.g. ext2) in the insecure world and
consider the code untrusted (i.e. the “evil twin”).
2. Exposing metadata to the untrusted local file system. As
the file system code needs to operate on the metadata (e.g. file
system inode table, block bitmap, and directory structure), the
storage substrate exposes an interface for the insecure world
to access the metadata.
3. Cloud as the verifier. We run a trusted, lightweight replica
of the same file system, i.e. the “good twin”, in the cloud. Its
2While recognizing that edge platforms often use flash-based storage, we
use “disk” as a generic term for non-volatile storage
only responsibility is to validate the legitimacy of any storage
operations that the untrusted edge file system suggests to exe-
cute. The cloud replica timely incorporates newest bugfixes,
but no new file system features.
In this architecture, only the device TEE possesses the file
data; both the device’s insecure world and the cloud work on
their own metadata copies.
Workflow As shown in Figure 2, a secure client invokes
file API (e.g. “write to file /local/data offset 42”). If the data
happens to be in the secure page cache ( 1 ), the execution
never leaves the TEE for consulting file systems. Upon cache
miss, Overwatch sends the invocation to both the local file
system (the untrusted evil twin) and the cloud replica (the
trusted good twin), which both return storage operations re-
sulted from the invoked API (e.g. “writing the given data
[opaque reference] to disk block 42”) ( 2 3 ). Conceptually,
only when the twins return the same operations, the secure
block layer executes such validated operations on the pro-
tected storage ( 4 ). With this architecture, the good twin
(remote) ultimately guarantees the security objectives, while
the evil twin (local) is crucial to performance optimization,
as will be discussed in Section 4.
Security benefits i) Our approach offers strong confiden-
tiality over the file data. By exploiting TrustZone’s static
partitioning of memory and IO hardware (§2), we ensure file
data, as well as the memory and storage hardware containing
the data, are strongly isolated from the rest of a smart device,
including the commodity OS. The autonomy of TrustZone
eliminates controlled channel attacks through page faults [17].
The file data is never disclosed to the cloud either, as the lat-
ter only operates on metadata. ii) Our approach offers high
assurance of correctness: the assurance no longer depends on
the integrity of local file system and OS that face high threats,
but on the integrity of the cloud. By continuously validating
the block-level activities at run time, it assures the apps that
file data is safely kept persistent and can be readily read back.
4 Overwatch Design
Our security approach above takes a somewhat idealistic po-
sition. To realize the model and make it practical, we have
addressed the following challenges with novel system designs.
1. How to make file data flow between the clients and the
storage hardware without leaving TEE?
2. How should the TEE differentiate file data and metadata?
3. How to hide long network delays?
4. How to ensure consistency between twin file systems?
5. How to continue operating when the cloud is discon-
nected?
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4.1 Secure data path
As discussed in Section 3.3, Overwatch incorporates in TEE
the VFS and the block layer from the commodity OS. These
layers are generic; compared to file systems, they are thinner,
only adding 1K SLoC to the TEE code.
It has relatively simple responsibilities: manage file-related
data structures (e.g., file descriptor table and page cache), and
call into the file system-specific control functions. Hence,
Overwatch also implements a simple yet generic virtual file
system layer, Overwatch secure VFS ( 1 ). It provides a basic
abstraction for opened files through a secure file descriptor
table, and the protection of data through secure data path.
Secure file descriptor table To secure clients Overwatch
presents POSIX file APIs. To do so, it keeps in TEE a file de-
scriptor table, keeping track all opened files and their current
access positions. When forwarding file APIs to the local file
system, Overwatch obfuscates all file names and bookkeeps
the mapping between the obfuscated file names exposed to the
file system and the actual file names used by secure clients.
Secure page cache is where the Overwatch holds the re-
cently accessed file data in memory. Similar to Linux’s page
cache, the secure page cache is essentially a dictionary keep-
ing 〈 f ile,o f f set〉 → page, block_id. Any file API hits the
cache will be served by the cache within TEE. Only upon a
cache miss the Overwatch forwards the file API to the twins
of file systems. The secure page cache only keeps user blocks
not metadata blocks, which are manipulated by the local file
system with untrusted contents.
And upon the delegated file operation returns, the verified
blocks will be read from secure storage to fill corresponding
pages. This is because the secure world never relies on the
metadata to perform control path.
Secure block layer The block layer exposes a very narrow
interface: copy data between a TEE memory address and a
block on the secure storage. For read(), the block layer copies
a disk block to the secure page cache, and then to a buffer
supplied by the secure app; for write(), the block layer copies
a secure app’s buffer to the secure page cache; for sync(), the
block layer copies data from secure page cache to disk blocks.
4.2 Metadata stencils
Based on our idea of only exposing metadata (§3.3), the TEE
serves metadata to the untrusted file system code (Figure 2
2 ). In doing so, Overwatch must i) reject any request to file
data; ii) redact the metadata that contain user information (e.g.
directory name) before serving; iii) serve metadata in cleart-
ext if it contains no user information. It is worth noting the
metadata includes directory links (but not directory names),
which is required by the file system for walking file paths. To
do so, Overwatch must know metadata’s disk locations, for
which it relies on metadata stencils.
What are metadata stencils? Metadata stencils, a compact
data structure in TEE, encode the knowledge of metadata’s
disk locations. Conceptually, for each block on the secure stor-
age, a stencil specifies the bytes that represent metadata, e.g.
“block 42: byte 0-127 [metadata]”. To serve a block read from
the local file system, Overwatch consults the corresponding
metadata stencil, reveals the metadata bytes, and redacts the
remaining. similarly, for a block write Overwatch only over-
writes the data bytes. In practice, the metadata stencils are
highly compact: file systems such as ext2/3 use separate disk
blocks for metadata and data, allowing a one-bit stencil for
each block; file systems such as BTRFS and F2FS may co-
locate metadata and data in the same block, yet we find only
such blocks only constitute a small fraction.
How to generate metadata stencils? The metadata stencils
are generated by parsing two on-disk data structures: the
super block and inodes. The super block describes the usage
of all live disk blocks; the inode structure describes any file
data that may be embedded in an inode block. The two data
structures are file system specific; their layouts are stable
across different versions of the same file system, because a file
system typically keeps its disk layout backward-compatible.
Upon file system boots, a simple parser locates and parses the
super block (identified by its well-known magic number) and
inodes, establishing metadata stencils for all live blocks.
Who should generate the stencils? We have investigated
the following two solutions. The cloud replica generates the
stencils based on the metadata it possesses; it piggybacks the
stencils to its validation responses. Overwatch runs on device
without any file system-specific logic; it remains agnostic to
the type of file system (e.g. ext2 or f2fs) running out of TEE.
Overwatch can be deployed to the TEE once and remains
sealed afterwards.
Alternatively, Overwatch may generates and maintains the
stencils by itself. This requires Overwatch to incorporate a
separate parser for each type of file systems it works with.
Yet, data confidentiality is stronger: it completely depends
on the TEE and independent of the cloud. We will test this
solution in evaluation (§6).
4.3 Memoizing verified file-block mapping
Unlike write(), an uncached and trusted read() is syn-
chronous. Because Overwatch will have to wait for the cloud
to return validated blocks to proceed, it inevitably incurs laten-
cies that worsens linearly with elongated network delays and
suffers much from unstable network connections. To optimize
for such cases, our key insight is to reduce the remote valida-
tion by memoizing the file offsets with their corresponding
verified data blocks and return the data blocks directly to the
application.
Our rationale is that, the mappings from file offsets (i.e. the
input of file system execution) to locations in page caches
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and disk blocks (i.e. the output of file system execution) will
remain valid until future file API invocations alter the file
system metadata.
It works like a cushion to the secure page cache: whenever
a page in the secure page cache gets evicted due to limited
memory size, Overwatch memoizes the blocks and file offset
that map to the spilled page. And after read() misses the
search in page cache, it will then search among the memoized
disk blocks and return the trusted data blocks if it finds the
corresponding blocks. Also, it implies that the read from the
offset within the same disk blocks will not require remote
validation, either. For instance, in serving two consecutive
reads at the same file at offset 42 and 128, the Overwatch
avoids invoking the file system and the cloud for the second
read, because the two offsets are known to map to the same
block and the mapping is unchanged. We will evaluate this
mechanism in Section 6.4.
4.4 Hiding network delays
Overwatch incorporates the following mechanisms. Essen-
tially, it exploits the untrusted local file system for speed and
relies on the trusted cloud replica for correctness.
Overlapping network/storage delays Overwatch executes
storage operations from the (untrusted) local file system as
soon as they become available; the Overwatch rolls back
the operations if it receives dissension from the cloud later.
By doing so, the Overwatch overlaps the network latency
(typically tens to a few hundred ms) with the local storage
latency (typically a few to tens of ms).
Overlapping network/computation delays As described
before, Overwatch provides POSIX file APIs to its clients.
It further provides an option for the clients to observe the
outcome of unvalidated storage operations.
Our rationale is to give the clients opportunities to handle
unvalidated (and hence untrusted) file data with their own
logic. For instance, the camera code may process unvalidated
images it reads from storage while the validation is still pend-
ing. For read(), Overwatch returns the requested data to
the client and indicates the data is yet to be validated; for
write(), Overwatch checkpoints the blocks to be modified
(in case of future rollbacks) and taints the modified blocks
and pages as untrusted (in case of future read from them). In
case the cloud rejects the data operations, Overwatch rolls
back to the earlier version without the modifications.
To support the option, Overwatch introduces a light inter-
face augmentation, by adding two flags to existing file APIs.
In open(), Overwatch supports a new untrusted flag, indicat-
ing that any subsequent access of this particular file will return
with the results from the local file system without waiting for
the remote validation to complete. In select(), Overwatch
supports a new validation flag which serves as a validation
barrier. Overwatch will block the caller client until all pend-
ing validations pertaining to this file are completed. The new
flags are simple yet sufficiently powerful to support overlap-
ping between computation and network delay. Section 6 will
present a case study.
4.5 Coping with emergencies
Emergency file for cloud disconnection Overwatch sup-
ports clients to write a fixed amount of data reliably without
any remote validation. This is important for keeping time-
critical user data persistent, e.g. an image frame containing a
person’s face of interest. To do so, during file system initializa-
tion and while the cloud is connected, Overwatch creates an
emergency file and pre-allocates all its blocks and remembers
all its data blocks by memoization, as described in Section 4.3.
As the mappings between file offsets and disk blocks are all
known to the storage substrate, it can safely access the file
without consulting the cloud. The size of the emergency file
is configurable to the device user.
Maintaining crash consistency Overwatch applies 2-phase
commit (2PC) protocol [10] to maintain consistency between
the two file systems on the edge and the cloud. On the lo-
cal smart device, for on each file operation that changes the
metadata (e.g. write to a new file) Overwatch piggybacks
an additional commit request to the cloud; on the cloud, when
Overwatch receiving the file operation and the commit re-
quest, Overwatch executes the file operation but saves the
modified metadata into a temporary file and piggybacks an ok
to commit message with the block requests. Then after receiv-
ing the message, the smart device executes the verified block
requests and sends the final commit message to the cloud.
Lastly, only upon receiving the final commit from the edge
should the cloud write the modified metadata persistently to
its storage. In this way, if the device crashes (e.g. due to power
failure) before executing the file operations, the cloud will
not receive the final commit and thus will not update its copy
of metadata; however, if it’s due to temporary disconnection,
on the next successful connection, the smart device will re-
send the commit, thus allowing the cloud to update its copy,
keeping both copies consistent.
4.6 Maintaining the cloud replica
A metadata-only file system The cloud replica of local de-
vice’s file system, called Overwatch file system (OFS), runs
in the cloud to verify the block requests of the untrusted file
systems on the smart device. OFS has the same control logic
as the local file system but operates only on the metadata (i.e.,
inode table, block bitmap, inode bitmap, etc. in the ext family).
Its initial metadata is replicated when the local file system is
first initialized (e.g., when mkfs). Since then, the subsequent
replication of metadata is performed by replaying each file
operation sent by the smart device, where the consistency is
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maintained by 2PC protocol, as discussed in Section 4.5. It
is worth noting that OFS only maintains and operates on its
replica of metadata. It never possesses or touches the actual
user data. Therefore, the replay is cheap and that the device
is free from transferring its data to the cloud, which is worry-
free of any potential user data leakage, and reduces the data
transfer overhead aggressively, as will be shown in §6.3.
Operation verifier After sending the file operations to the
cloud, the in-TEE operation verifier (shown in Figure 2) re-
ceives the block requests generated by OFS and verifies those
issued by the untrusted OS. As discussed, Overwatch dele-
gates file operations to both the untrusted file system and the
cloud replica (OFS). Upon receiving the file operation, OFS
executes the file operation by consulting and manipulating
its replica of metadata; as a result, it generates a sequence
of block requests, and responds to the operation verifier with
these block requests. The operation verifier compares gener-
ated block requests. The matching block requests (i.e. both
the requested block number and request type are the same)
result in a successful data read/write while failure leads to
data roll back, as discussed in Section 4.4.
5 Implementation
We have built Overwatch in 5K lines of C code (reported
by Sloccount [81]). We implement the following major
Overwatch components, which are agnostic to specific file
systems.
1) The Overwatch runtime within on-device TEE. We
build it atop OP-TEE OS v2.6 [68], where we add 3K for
new implementation and reuse the exception handling and
RPC facility to handle world switch. We emulate the secure
storage as a ramdisk. We implement the metadata stencil by
porting only 300 lines of code from libext2 and libf2fs.
Block requests from the untrusted file system are verified
sequentially.
2) A small kernel module in the smart device kernel (Linux
v4.9) to forward the delegated file operations to the twin of
file systems. It sets up shared memory as the secure communi-
cation channel, and establishes the network connection with
the cloud. To support multiple commodity file systems, we
also modify loop device driver of the on-device Linux kernel.
3) A secure communication channel between the TEE
and the local file system. The channel passes messages
through shared memory which has a fixed size of 4KB.
The channel serves two purposes: 1) passing file APIs and
block requests. Invocations to file APIs are identified by
<op,fd,flag,count,name>. Block requests, resulted from
untrusted file system’s execution, are a sequence of block
numbers represented by 32-bit integers. 2) passing metadata
blocks. Overwatch serves metadata block requests after they
are checked against the metadata stencil. For read, Overwatch
reads the requested metadata blocks from the secure storage
and deposits it in the communication channel, which will
be collected by the untrusted file system; write is a mirror
process.
4) A cloud server for running the metadata-only file sys-
tem replica. We implement the server in a straightforward
way, which keeps listening, parsing, and executing the file
operations from the smart device on the file system replica.
Since the server must respond to smart devices with block
operations, we run a privileged service on the server to extract
the block operations to the user space. Note that an alternative
is to use userspace block device (BUSE [1]), which does not
require a privileged service on the cloud server.
Smart device applications Atop Overwatch, we build three
applications derived from real-world smart devices:
1. A cleaning robot (Robot) for house cleaning [44]. We
derive the workloads from Xiaomi Vacuum Robot [3]. When
cleaning, the robot sequentially updates a log file every 200ms;
each entry is 32-byte 3-tuple containing coordinates (x, y)
and the angle. After cleaning, the robot reads back the whole
log file, reconstructs the cleaning map using SLAM in PPM
format; each pixel of the map is 5cm in physical world and
a typical map size is therefore tens to a few hundred KB. At
last the robot writes back the map file to disk. We fix the log
size to 512KB and map size to 256KB.
2. A voice assistant (Voice) for interacting with user speech
commands [7]. We derive the workloads from Mycroft [7].
When starting, the voice assistant first loads a set of user-
defined rules, called skills, to respond to user speech; each
skill is a directory under ~/.mycroft/ containing a .voc and
a .intent file to identify the intent of user, a .dialog file to
respond to user, and a .json file to describe the skill; every
2s the device will scan the three skill files using fstat in
case any modification or updates. After boot, it listens to the
user speech in the background, records the audio, and stores
the recording as a wav file under /tmp; it then runs speech to
text transcription (STT) and responds to user according to the
STT results and existing skill.
3. An intelligent camera (Camera) for license plate recogni-
tion. We derive the workloads from intelligent traffic systems.
As the surveillance goes on, the camera periodically captures
and saves images (1080P in JPG format). Every other 10
seconds, it reads in the saved images and runs license plate
detection algorithm on them; on the images, the algorithm
detects canny edge, dilates them, and then find license plate
blobs. Finally, it draws bounding box around detected plate
blobs and saves the resulting image. We use images from
UFPR-ALPR dataset [66]. For the application, we ported to
TEE SOD [9], a popular embedded computer vision library.
These applications serve as our macrobenchmarks.
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Overwatch Runtime 
Secure VFS Metadata stencil Kernel substrate Total
2K 1K 1K 4K 
Linux Storage Stack
VFS Memory mgmt Block EXT2 F2FS Total
22K 21K 10.3K 6K 18K 77.3K
Table 2: A comparison between the source of Overwatch
and that of the Linux storage stack, showing that Overwatch
reduces the on-device TCB significantly.
6 Evaluation
In this section, we seek to answer the following questions:
1. How does Overwatch reduce TCB and thwart attacks?
2. What is the security overhead of Overwatch?
3. How does Overwatch’s API augmentation (§4.4) impact
programmability and reduce overhead?
6.1 Security Analysis
6.1.1 TCB analysis
On-device TCB size Table 2(a) shows a breakdown of the
Overwatch source code, which only adds 4K SLoC to the
TCB. The size of the Overwatch binary is 52KB, a small
fraction (3.3%) of the entire OP-TEE binary.
TCB interfaces The Overwatch secure runtime only exports
two functions: one for issuing file API requests (to both file
system twins) and one for receiving block requests from the
untrusted local file system. Two worlds share no state; all
messages and the enclosing arguments are passed by value.
Comparison to alternative TCB Compared to enclosing
the entire Linux storage stack in TEE (the source count listed
in Table 2(b), Overwatch significantly reduces the storage
stack’s on-device TCB by 16×. This is because Overwatch
completely excludes the file system logic (ext2 and f2fs in
our example) from the TEE and implements compact data
functions for the TEE.
6.1.2 Attacks thwarted by Overwatch
Attack Attack Vector Violated SG Defense Mechanism
Iago attack Block read C-- Metadata stencil
Iago attack Block write -IFV Operation Verifier
Iago attack File descriptor -IFV Secure VFS
PF/Cache File & offset C-- TEE Property
SG: security guarantees.
C: user data confidentiality; I: user data integrity; F: user data freshness; V:
verifiable persistence;
Table 3: List of attacks and defense mechanisms of
Overwatch. PF/Cache denotes page fault and cache based
attack.
Table 3 shows an overview of major attacks that target an
smart device to compromise our security guarantees.
Iago attack. As disclosed in [31], a compromised kernel
can forge return results of system services, subverting the
efforts of prior approaches that delegate file operations to
an untrusted file system [58, 68]. For example, when prior
approaches delegate open("/ofs.txt") to the untrusted file
system, a compromised file system may request TEE for user
data blocks instead of the only required metadata blocks of
"ofs.txt", hence resulting in sensitive information leakage.
Overwatch defeats Iago attack in the following way: first,
the metadata stencil ensures only metadata can pass over to the
untrusted file system with any inlined user data erased. Sec-
ond, the operation verifier verifies each resultant user block
request with the cloud, which ensures the legitimacy of user
block requests. Lastly, the user block data always stays in se-
cure page cache and is never disclosed to the untrusted world.
Hence, with these components as a package, Overwatch de-
feats Iago attack in a straightforward way.
Page fault & cache side-channel attack. Page fault attacks
are usually launched against SGX [86], since a compromised
SGX driver is able to modify page attributes belong to SGX
enclave and cause page faults to infer the memory access
pattern. However, by exploiting TrustZone, Overwatch is
by design immune to such an attack because TEE memory
is physically isolated and thus transparent to normal world.
Therefore, normal world is unable to tamper with TrustZone
memory, and to launch page fault attacks. To defeat cache side-
channel attack, Overwatch fully confines cached read/write
to Trustzone, and flushes its cache before switching back to
the normal world. As a result, no cache contention between
secure world and normal world can occur to launch cache
side-channel attack [91], hence Overwatch thwarts cache
side-channel attack.
What can be learnt by eavesdroppers?
• The cloud server and the local OS, by running the twin file
systems, are able to access metadata which we set to reveal
(§2.4). They access directory and file names in encrypted form
but cannot decrypt them. They observe file API invocations
with API semantics only (§2.4). They observe uncached block
access activities, while most of block accesses are cached in
TEE and hence invisible. They cannot touch file data.
• A network-level eavesdropper observes encrypted network
traffic to/from the smart device. She can infer the activi-
ties of file access and block access without knowing which
files/blocks are accessed.
6.2 Methodology
Test setup We test Overwatch on Hikey [6], an ARM-based
development board, as the smart device. We choose this board
for its good support for TrustZone. The details of Hikey are
summarized in Table 4. We run an x86 machine as the cloud
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SoC HiSilicon Kirin 620 Normal OS Debian 8 (Linux 4.9) 
CPU 8x ARM Cortex-A53@1.2 GHz Secure OS OP-TEE 2.6 
 
Table 4: The test platform used as a smart device
server. The two machines are connected by Ethernet in an
isolated LAN. We use Linux traffic control (tc) on the x64
machine to emulate different network conditions.
We test Overwatch with ext2 and f2fs, with two commod-
ity, unmodified file systems; we choose them to represent
different levels of complexity: while ext2 is classic and sim-
ple, f2fs is modern and feature-rich.
We run a suite of macrobenchmarks and microbenchmarks.
Prior to each run, we reboot both devices in order to have
a cold cache. As the current TrustZone TEE lacks device
drivers for flash storage, we use ramdisk in TEE as the secure
disk. We cap the ramdisk performance at 4K IOPS, which
typical in today’s low-cost flash.
Macrobenchmarks To understand Overwatch’s end-to-end
impact, we run the applications described in Section 5. We
define overhead metrics for applications based on their objec-
tives. For Camera, we study its loss of throughput in image
processing. For Voice and Robot, we study the extra delays
they experience in each mission, i.e. data logging and map
reconstruction, and responses to user voice commands respec-
tively. We test under a spectrum of typical network delays
according to recent study [54].
We show Overwatch’s impacts on latency of Robot and
Voice as they are latency-sensitive. We then shift the fo-
cus on its impacts on throughput of Camera. This is be-
cause compared with Robot and Voice whose workloads are
lightweight data logging, Camera is more compute-intensive
and thus stresses throughput more.
Microbenchmarks To understand the overhead of
Overwatch’s on-device security mechanisms, we run a se-
ries of stress tests. We run Iozone v3.482 [29], a widely
adopted file system benchmark suites for Linux. We con-
figure Overwatch to bypass validation with the cloud replica
while still keeping all on-device mechanisms on. To exclude
the benefit of cache and observe the security overhead, we
set the O_DIRECT flag in file APIs to force each read/write
hit the Overwatch. We then compare Overwatch with native,
insecure file systems which run in the normal world atop
ramdisk.
6.3 Application security overhead
Our results show Overwatch adds moderate overhead to the
representative smart device applications.
Application latency increase Overwatch adds moderate
latency overhead to the application, considering different net-
work delay and on-device security hardening.
Overall, at the common latency segment (50ms),
Overwatch incurs as little overhead as 15% in Robot
(f2fs). Overwatch achieves such low overhead due to the
asynchronous writes – the application does not block while
waiting for the blocks to be verified. Moreover, the secure
page cache facilitates trusted read without going to the cloud,
it saves significant RTT in the Robot benchmark where the
whole log is read back for map reconstruction. In Voice,
Overwatch incurs 45% overhead. This is because Voice
requires three fstat in each run, which is sensitive to the
network delay due to its synchronous nature. (§5)
Application throughput loss As shown in Figure 3, in a
broad latency spectrum, Overwatch causes the throughput of
Camera to drop by no more than 5%. The low overhead is
due to two factors: 1) for read, the storage architecture which
caches recently produced image data, reducing consultation
with the cloud replica and the secure disk; 2) for write, most
operations are asynchronous and hence effectively overlap
with the application’s processing of subsequent images.
Network bandwidth usage Overwatch incurs light over-
head in network bandwidth usage, as the smart device and the
cloud only exchange compact validations instead of actual file
data. Even in Camera, our most data-intensive application, the
smart device uses uplink/downlink bandwidth at 3.7 KB/sec
and 2.6 KB/sec respectively, which are minor as compared to
typical wireless bandwidth today (hundreds KB/sec) [54].
Cloud server overhead In running the file system replica,
the cloud server sees negligible CPU overhead as the execu-
tion is bound by network delays. Possessing only metadata,
the replica is also space-efficient. To support a 4GB disk on
device, the metadata stored by the cloud replica are up to
12MB for f2fs, and up to 65MB for ext2. This implies that
every 1TB cloud storage server can support up to 87k and 16k
smart device instances running f2fs and ext2, respectively.
6.4 Security overhead under stress test
We run the aforementioned stress test to understand the over-
head of Overwatch’s on-device components.
Overhead of Overwatch execution Overwatch’s on-
device security mechanisms introduce noticeable overhead:
because of them, the throughput of microbenchmark drops by
25% on average (24% for sequential and 26% for random).
Between the two commodity file systems we tested, f2fs ex-
periences higher overhead (33% on average) than ext2 (18%
on average), likely due to the former’s more sophistic logic
and hence more (sometimes 10x) block requests.
Impact of metadata stencil. The metadata stencil examines
each outgoing block served to the local file system. For ext2
in which file data and metadata do not co-locate on the same
block, checking a block against its metadata stencil is sim-
ply examining a flag (§4.2). This incurs minor overhead, e.g.
compared to native-ext2, the sequential read throughput of
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Figure 4: Microbenchmark performance of Overwatch compared with native, insecure file systems. Benchmark: Iozone [29].
Read/write size = 4KB. O_DIRECT flag set.
overwatch-ext2 drops by 18%. However, for f2fs in which
file data and metadata may co-locate, applying metadata sten-
cil requires to redact inline file data in the outgoing block.
This reduces throughput by up to 41%, shown in the bottom
figures of Figure 4 (a) and (c).
Cross-world invocations cause low delays. It only takes few
thousand nanoseconds for the normal world file system to
receive file APIs sent by the TEE, and vice versa. In a file API
(e.g. fstat) that must invoke both local/cloud file systems
synchronously, the cross-world invocation delay is negligible
as compared to the network delay (in milliseconds). Within a
cross-world invocation, the world switch takes around 49ns.
Memoizing validations effectively reduces network trips and
hence overhead. We demonstrate this with the benchmark,
which writes 512KB to the file and read them back for pro-
cessing; this is similar to Robot benchmark and the write-read
back for processing pattern can be commonly found in other
edge processing devices. As shown in Figure 5, memoizing
reduces latency significantly, by up to 291%. The saving is
more pronounced with smaller secure page cache. This is be-
cause even an access to a file offset misses the page cache and
has to hit the secure disk, Overwatch still knows which block
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Figure 6: Application latency of the Camera app, showing
the comparison among native (insecure), the execution time
with that of adopting UNTRUST and TRUSTED api. Network
RTT is 100ms.
the offset maps to and can safely skip consulting local/cloud
file systems. The saving is substantial because consulting the
cloud file system is much slower than accessing the secure
disk.
6.5 A case study of using the augmented API
1 for (i = 0; i < N_FILES; i++) {
2 /*Allow read to return untrusted data*/
3 fd_in=open(in[i],O_UNTRUSTED|O_RDONLY);
4 fd_out=open(out[i],O_CREAT|O_WRONLY);
6 /*Determine data size for read*/
7 fstat(fd_in , &stat);
8 /*Read untrusted data*/
9 ret=read(fd_in ,buf,stat.st_size);
11 /* Make image */
12 img = make_image(buf, IMG_JPG);
13 /* Processing untrusted data. slow. */
14 ret = detect_license(img, buf, &sz);
16 /*Wait for validation*/
17 ret = select(fd_in , VALIDATION, ...);
18 if (ret == SUCCESS) { /* validated */
19 /* Write results to new file */
20 write(fd_out , buf, sz);
21 } else { /* validation failed */
22 /*..discard compute results..*/
23 }
24 close(fd_in);
25 close(fd_out);
26 }
Listing 1: Code example showing the use of untrusted
reads. The augmented API is highlighted in bold and red.
Overwatch gives applications an option to access file data
before validation arrives (§4.3) and hence hide network la-
tency. To understand the entailed programming burden and
performance reward, we build a revision of the camera appli-
cation. The application open a series of input image files, runs
license detection on them, and write results to output image
files. In the new version, the application opens input images
files by specifying the untrusted flag (line 3, 4). When the
application reads in images, Overwatch therefore returns the
data as soon as the local file system gives the block numbers.
As the application gets the untrusted image data, it computes,
and executes a validation barrier (line 17). Only on successful
validation (i.e. the vision algorithm has executed on a correct
input image) will the application write back the processed
image (line 20). With minor source changes, the application
overlaps the vision compute with network delay in validating
a read.
Figure 6 shows the application latency reduction as the
reward from handling the untrusted data. With fully trusted
read/write, the application incurs 26% higher latency as com-
pared to a native execution baseline; with untrusted read, that
overhead is reduced to 8%. Note that, the use of untrusted file
access is optional.
7 Related Work
We next discuss related work that is not covered so far.
Defending against untrusted OSes with TEE Recent re-
search has recognized OSes as untrusted [31] and examined
various countermeasures against them, e.g. by relying trusted
hypervisors [33, 71, 52] and trusted compilers [37]. To pro-
tect important software components against untrusted OSes,
many systems use TEEs. Haven [24] protects unmodified
apps and ports FAT32 into an SGX enclave. Scone [19] se-
cures containers with TEE. Graphene [80] ports a library OS
to protect apps in TEE. Obliviate [17] exploits ORAM to
keep file operations in TEE oblivious. TrustShadow [48] fo-
cuses on protecting memory integrity of apps, and delegates
syscalls to an untrusted OS. Similar to them, we do not trust
the OSes, and use TEE to shield critical execution; unlike
them, we focus on file system and propose new partitioning
between data functions and control functions for protection;
we also support multiple commodity file systems.
Much work uses TEEs (mostly TrustZone) to enforce sys-
tem software invariants. TZ-RKP [21] intercepts and ex-
amines control-critical instructions (e.g., pagetable update);
Sprobes [43] checks kernel integrity to guard its code integrity.
Like much of them, we build on TrustZone; different from
them, we do not enforce any invariant for ensuring integrity
but instead verifying with the cloud. Trustgyges [40] exploits
TEE to hide file data from an untrusted smartphone OS. It
neither partitions the storage stack nor use the cloud for vali-
dation.
Replicated execution. The idea of replicated execution
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traces back to 1968 [62] and is used to detect and locate
bugs, provide fault-tolerance [60, 70, 50], and offer security
guarantees [36, 26, 87]. Compared to them, we adopt the
idea of replicated execution for security, but are the first to
apply it to file systems to our knowledge. Replicated exe-
cution is also used for resource efficiency [41]. Tango [46],
MAUI [38], and Clonecloud [34] offload compute-intensive
code from smartphones to the cloud. Like them, we exploit
the collaboration of cloud and the local device; unlike them,
we focus on using the cloud for security without disclosing
user data. Knockoff [39] ships IO traces from clients to the
cloud for creating multiple versions of disk image. Similar to
it, Overwatch exchanges file/block requests with the cloud;
unlike it, Overwatch does not upload file data but use the
cloud as the verifier for file system behaviors.
Trustworthy file systems. A traditional approach to keeping
file data confidential is through cryptographic file system,
either stackable [28, 83] or integrated natively [51]. Compared
to them, we do not trust the commodity kernel but reuse its file
system logic. Cryptographic file systems are also designed
for distributed computing. Plutus [59] supports file-sharing
on untrusted storage with cryptographic key distribution and
management. SiRius [45] further guarantees freshness using
Merkle tree. SUNDR [67] detects tamper on files on untrusted
servers. While such prior work and Overwatch share the goal
of file system security for networked computers, Overwatch
offers strong security guarantees, e.g. assured persistence, and
therefore introduces different techniques.
8 Conclusions
Smart devices produce security-critical data and keep them
persistent on local storage. The current storage software on
smart devices offer weak security guarantees. We propose
a new storage architecture to provide data confidentiality,
integrity, and assured persistence. Following an outsource-
and-verify approach, we isolate file data in TEE, shielding it
from commodity file systems. We execute a metadata-only
replica of the file system in the cloud, which continuously
validate the behaviors of the on-device file system. We im-
plement Overwatch and analyze its security properties. We
demonstrate that Overwatch works with commodity file sys-
tem and incurs moderate overhead. Overwatch represents a
new design point for storage stacks.
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